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Abstract: The availability and accessibility of digital data are increasingly significant in the creation 
of archaeological knowledge with, for example, multiple datasets being brought together to perform 
extensive analyses that would not otherwise be possible. However, this makes capturing the silences 
in those data—what is absent as well as present, what is unknown as well as what is known—a 
critical challenge for archaeology in terms of the suitability and appropriateness of data for 
subsequent reuse. This paper reverses the usual focus on knowledge and considers the role of 
ignorance—the lack of knowledge, or nonknowledge—in archaeological data and knowledge 
creation. Examining aspects of archaeological practice in the light of different dimensions of 
ignorance, it proposes ways in which the silences, the range of unknowns, can be addressed within 
a digital environment and the benefits which may accrue. 
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1. Introduction 
A new scientific paradigm in archaeology has recently been characterized: from Kristiansen’s 
“Third Science Revolution” [1] (pp. 12-14), through Sørensen’s “Scientific Turn” and its “new 
empiricism” [2] (p. 101), to Cunningham and MacEachern’s discussion of archaeology’s aspiration to 
become “big science” [3] (p. 630), for example. In such an environment, it can be argued that 
empiricism in archaeology has become resurgent (e.g., [2,4,5]), promoting knowledge and its 
acquisition through observation, experimentation, recording, and analysis. However, with the 
foregrounding of knowledge, ignorance, or simply the lack of knowledge, can become an absence, a 
silence, a void to be filled:  
“our understanding … is a delicate interplay of knowing and not knowing. However, because 
we are often aware of what we know, and rarely aware of what we do not, we tend to 
overemphasize the range and importance of our knowing. While the known and the knowable 
are minute portions of the unknown, it is the known we identify with ‘reality’” [6] (p. 173).  
In this way a focus on knowledge and the knowable promotes the primacy of data and the 
authority of “facts”, and Sørensen argues that this new empiricism raises a number of challenges, not 
least in the way in which it “… generates an unhelpful return to the ethos of letting ‘data speak for 
itself’ … because… ‘facts do not lie’ and thus become associated with ‘truth’” and a “perceived need 
to force scientific methods onto otherwise ambiguous archaeological research topics …” [2] (p. 102); 
(see also [5] and see [7] for a contrary view). 
At the same time, an associated paradigm shift has been identified in archaeology’s equivalent 
of the “datalogical turn” (e.g., [8]): a new ontological approach built on the availability of digital data 
and its automated adaptive algorithmic processing [4]. Archaeological knowledge is increasingly 
predicated on digital data, much of it digitized from material analogs but increasingly born digital 
from the outset. This digitalization or datafication of the archaeological domain opens new 
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possibilities and perspectives in terms of access, reuse, and analysis of data in the creation of 
knowledge about the past. Underpinning this environment has been the creation of a wide variety of 
digital recording systems, the development and application of a broad range of analytical tools, and 
the establishment of digital infrastructures to store, categorize, and distribute data. However, the 
degree of standardization and conformity within these structures and associated analyses often 
disguises the diversity of archaeological data. For example, Huvila [9] (pp. 151-154) sees 
archaeological information as highly idiosyncratic, their fragmentary and incomplete character 
captured using a variety of standards and methodologies, and featuring multiple temporalities in 
terms of both the material remains and the documentation of them. Similarly, Martin-Rodilla [10] 
(pp. 33-34) characterizes archaeological data in terms of their temporal and spatial dimensions, their 
high degree of variability, their multidisciplinary nature, their preferentially textual focus, the 
vagueness of cognitive processes associated with reasoning around data, and limited studies about 
the visualization of data and the effects on knowledge generation. Although none of these 
characteristics should be a surprise to archaeologists, they emphasize the complexities of 
archaeological data in relation to knowledge creation, underlined by Wylie’s description of 
archaeology as a discipline defined by the challenges of working with gaps and absences in its 
primary data [11] (p. 204).  
In a digital environment, however, it can seem as if this awareness is set aside: narrative 
subtleties are frequently lost as data are combined, mined, recycled, and repurposed. The 
amalgamation of multiple datasets, the stripping of context, the remoteness encouraged by 
algorithmic methods, and the embrace of the large-scale over small detail all combine to provide a 
challenging environment for archaeological knowledge creation (e.g., [4] (p. S13)). In such 
circumstances, what is needed is a means of characterizing and capturing the absences in 
archaeological data, rather than setting them aside. The rise of new empiricism combined with the 
growth of datafication in archaeology makes it an appropriate time to reconsider our approach to 
archaeological knowledge and its shadowy data [11]. 
2. Current Practice  
Aspects of these absences are recognized, most evidently in the debates surrounding the 
importance of providing contextual information alongside data. The move to open and reproducible 
science in archaeology has highlighted the importance of context as a means of maximizing data reuse 
potential through providing information about the circumstances of discovery and the methods used 
in data retrieval, categorization, and analysis, for example (e.g., [12–14]). Metadata is understood to 
address this by providing descriptions of data that enable a common context to be provided across 
different datasets. Typically, however, most metadata are focused on the needs of discovery (the title 
of the dataset, its nature, and location, authorship, rights, sources, etc.). Consequently, metadata 
primarily serves the purpose of reuse only insofar as it facilitates the search for potential datasets to 
reuse. Beyond metadata, the concept of paradata has been used to describe what might otherwise be 
termed “data provenance”: the decisions and processes surrounding the collection, recording, 
modification, and processing of data (e.g., [15–17]). However, the precise constituents of paradata are 
ill-defined. For example, the Seville Principles for virtual archaeology simply refer to paradata in 
terms of the need for clarity, conciseness, and availability, alongside the importance of providing as 
much information as possible [18] (p. 280). Elsewhere, paradata has been described as 
“documentation about equipment, protocols, procedures for collecting and processing data, and 
experimental or laboratory conditions of data handling” [19]. In archaeology, paradata has been 
characterized simply as the recording of “interpretative decisions” [20] (p. 121) or more explicitly in 
terms of “detailed information about the excavation of the remains, the analyst’s training and 
expertise, where analysis took place, which methods and reference materials were used, how the 
dataset was modified, etc.” [12] (p. 45). What paradata precisely consists of is not specified further, 
and the way in which paradata are prepared and presented is equally loosely defined. For example, 
it may consist of a document, or a separately published peer-reviewed paper, or shared online and 
linked to the dataset [12] (p. 45).  
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Three key aspects may be drawn from this brief overview of paradata. First, a seeming paradox 
of paradata is its potentially infinite regression. As Gant and Reilly [21] (p. 109) observe, the 
provenance of paradata is itself a subject of further meta/paradata, creating what they call layers of 
nested datasets of introspection, or “peridata”. Similarly, Martin-Rodilla and Gonzalez-Perez [22] (p. 
36) (see also [23] (pp. 181-189)) highlight that making metadata or “metainformation” the focus of 
study creates meta-metainformation, and argue that these “metastacks” underline that 
“metainformation is just a particular role that information may play in specific scenarios” [22] (p. 37). 
In other words, what is meta/paradata to one researcher may be data to another, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the loose definition and narrative form of most archaeological paradata lend themselves to 
differential interpretations and implementations by different projects and different authors. In the 
process, an opportunity is lost to use the paradata in an explicitly analytical way, or even to retrieve 
datasets according to qualities embedded in their paradata. This is despite the existence of more 
formal models for characterizing paradata, including the W3C model for data provenance [24] and 
the CRMdig extension to CIDOC CRM designed to capture paradata for digital data (e.g., [25,26]). 
Thirdly, the character of paradata remains relatively limited. While it extends what is traditionally 
seen as metadata, especially in its more structured forms it retains a relatively technical aspect with 
a strong focus on the digital background to digital data. For example, it focuses on the systems, 
formats, processing, and analytical methods used in creating the digital data, although it may not 
include the code or scripts actually used [27]. While perhaps inevitable, this technological emphasis 
means that nontechnological, more human-centered decisions and actions may be unrepresented. 
This might reasonably be expected to affect approaches to the data and consequently skew results in 
unforeseen and unrecognized ways. For example, a blind analysis of an archaeological faunal dataset 
[13] which lacked background contextual and methodological information (provenance, 
relationships, standards, etc.) demonstrated that different analysts arrived at different conclusions 
from the same data. For instance, analysts responded differently in terms of their aggregation of data 
categories and in their assessments of the reliability, consistency, and comparability of the data. These 
kinds of absences are characterized by Hand [28] as “dark data”: data that have not been recorded 
and remain largely hidden but which may have a major impact on subsequent use and interpretation. 
It is true that the problem of gaps and absences in the data is not new: it has always been a challenge 
to reuse data—digital or otherwise—that have been collected and presented by others. However, the 
digital nature of data exacerbates this situation through their availability and accessibility, increasing 
the knowledge distance between data producers and data reusers [29]. This makes it even more 
important to identify the silences and, once identified, to capture them. 
3. Introducing Ignorance 
One approach to the question of these silences is to switch from the traditional focus on 
knowledge and knowledge creation to one which considers what we do not know: essentially to 
examine our ignorance. Considering ignorance can be a valuable means to understanding knowledge 
since “… we often understand something by contrasting it with what it is not. Thus, we might get a 
better grip on knowledge by analyzing ignorance.” [30] (p. 57). Similarly, ignorance rather than 
knowledge can be seen to drive science [31], and “Awareness of ignorance occasions inquiry, and 
fuels it.” [6] (p. 172). This is not an approach that has been extensively investigated until recently (and 
not at all in archaeology) but beyond the obvious paradox—the desire to know what we do not know 
[32] (p. 18)—the approach offers a number of advantages. For example, Frickel identifies a series of 
strategies which can be used in combination to identify and explain the production of knowledge 
gaps, to “systematically investigate temporal and spatial processes of ignorance production and their 
institutionalization within and among different social domains.” [33] (p. 272). These include an 
“inferential approach”: “When actors understand themselves to be operating from a position of not-
knowing, they plan for and talk about what they do not know and they act accordingly.” [33] (p. 272). 
This inferential approach to ignorance sits well with an understanding of archaeological practice, 
such as in developing an excavation strategy for instance, and underlines that ignorance can act 
positively to guide future action.  
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If approaches to understanding ignorance accord with some perspectives on archaeological 
knowledge and new data-based empiricism (e.g., [5,34]), they are also seen to relate to information 
technologies. For example, while computers are typically seen as a means of increasing knowledge 
and thereby reduce ignorance, they may also enhance ignorance through misinformation and 
restricting access (e.g., [35] (p. 413)). Furthermore, the act of digitalization or datafication may also 
propagate ignorance: “Not only do our information systems limit information, they alter it to make 
it processable” [6] (p. 174). This highlights two key problematic areas. First, information technologies 
invisibly manipulate our access to knowledge and consequently create ignorance. For instance, the 
filter bubbles of online search tools, recommendation systems, social media, etc., tailor themselves to 
our interactions and shape what we subsequently encounter, while algorithmic big data and machine 
learning tools frequently disguise human biases (e.g., [36]). This is not something that has been 
addressed within an archaeological context in any detail, but it seems clear that, for example, digital 
archives providing gateways to archaeological data will influence discovery, retrieval, and 
subsequent analysis in various ways ([4] (p. S12); [37] (p. 338)). Secondly, the digitalization of data is 
itself reductive. To make data computable, accessible, and retrievable requires the structuring of 
recording systems, the atomization of selected attributes, the compression of information into largely 
predetermined categories, and so on. Much of this remains hidden, leaving users ignorant of the 
black-boxed structures, configurations, and algorithms embedded in the digital cognitive artifacts 
employed in archaeological analysis [38]. Together, these two factors support the use of the concept 
of ignorance as a means of considering the digital creation and manipulation of archaeological 
knowledge. As Frazier [39] (p. 1) observes, information science is typically defined in terms of what 
is seen, captured, and known (data, information, and knowledge often represented as the DIK(W) 
pyramid) whereas ignorance—or agnotology (the cultural production of ignorance and its study 
[40])—can be a valuable tool in addressing the ambiguities surrounding knowledge.  
Ignorance is not something that has been explicitly discussed within archaeology beyond 
perhaps its mitigation (e.g., [41] (pp. 128-129)), although it is related to more familiar discussions 
surrounding the uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity of archaeological data (e.g., [5,34]). The 
exception, however, is Wylie’s [42] discussion of ignorance within an archaeological context which is 
not widely cited in the archaeological literature. Wylie identified two aspects of archaeological 
ignorance. First are epistemological factors, where empirical data is lacking or has not survived, or 
the technologies to recover, analyze, and interpret the data do not yet exist [42] (p. 185). For example, 
Sørensen warns against archaeological treatments of empirical evidence that “categorically reduce or 
eliminate the role of absent data and the potential vagueness or ambiguity of data in the scientific 
pursuit of the human past” [2] (p. 107). Secondly, Wylie identifies ontological constraints, particularly 
in dealing with the complexities of human actions and intentions past and present [42] (p. 185). For 
example, Proctor [40] (p. 22) points to the different epistemic traditions of field archaeologists and 
linguistic archaeologists (philologists) concerning differences in understanding the costs of 
knowledge and ignorance in relation to artifact provenance. Wylie argues that the combination of 
these epistemological and ontological factors forces archaeologists seeking to reuse data into 
routinely undertaking what amounts to a secondary retrieval of data:  
“In the process, they find not only that the empirical legacy of 150 years of archaeological work 
is rife with gaps and inconsistencies, a reflection of evolving retrieval and recording practices, 
but also that it has been badly compromised by poor storage conditions, sometimes lost 
altogether, or dispersed among institutions in ways that greatly complicate any systematic use 
of existing records or collections.” [42] (p. 195).  
She points to “the creative use of new computer technologies” [42] (p. 195) as a means of 
addressing these problems, but it is argued here that digital tools are equally likely to compound or 
contribute to such issues in a way that may not always be entirely helpful. 
4. Characterizing Ignorance 
There are different dimensions to ignorance, and several approaches to categorizing them. For 
instance, Proctor [40] distinguishes between ignorance as a native state, where ignorance is the 
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common condition, overcome through the acquisition of knowledge [40] (pp. 4–6); ignorance as 
selective choice or bias, recognizing that any investigation focuses on certain aspects and omits others 
[40] (pp. 6–8); and ignorance as a strategic ploy, where it is actively cultivated to deceive, withhold 
information, misdirect, or deny access to knowledge [40] (pp. 8–10). In certain respects, Wylie’s [42] 
characterization of archaeological ignorance in terms of epistemological factors overlaps with 
Proctor’s native state ignorance, while her ontological factors overlap with Proctor’s selective 
ignorance. Whether archaeology actively employs ignorance as a strategic ploy would seem more 
controversial, although the degradation of open spatial data to reduce the risk of site looting would 
be one clear instance. Wylie’s categories are also akin to Smithson’s distinction between informational 
ignorance, where ignorance arises through errors concerning facts, and epistemological ignorance, 
errors in the processing of facts [43] (pp. 6–7). 
Probably the most popularly known characterization of ignorance is that of Donald Rumsfeld, 
when as US Secretary of Defense he referred to known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown 
unknowns in response to a question about whether evidence existed or not (e.g., [44]). As DeNicola 
[32] (p. 40) observes, Rumsfeld omitted the category of unknown knowns, things we do not know we 
know, while Kerwin [6] (pp. 178-182) had previously outlined similar categories of ignorance. 
Leaving aside known knowns as explicitly representing knowledge rather than ignorance, four 
specific aspects of ignorance can be usefully addressed in terms of unknowns (summarized in Table 
1):  
1. Things we know we do not know [6] (p. 179). These are the known unknowns representing a form 
of conscious ignorance [43] (p. 6) or specified ignorance [45] (p. 7). This may include 
nonknowledge (which may be taken into account in the future) and negative knowledge (where 
what is not known is considered unimportant) [46] (pp. 59-61). 
2. Things we do not know we do not know [6] (pp. 179–180). These are the unknown unknowns, 
otherwise referred to as unrecognized ignorance [45] (p. 10), ignorance-squared (i.e., ignorance 
of ignorance) [47] (p. 157), or nescience [46] (p. 66), for example. 
3. Things we think we know but do not know [6] (p. 180). These are characterized by Smithson as 
erroneous cognition or simply errors which may arise through distortions or biases, or through 
incomplete, uncertain, or missing information [43] (pp. 7–8). 
4. Things we do not know we know [6] (pp. 180–181). These are unknown knowns, things we do not 
realize we know, or which we operate through custom or instinct and are rarely articulated, 
otherwise known as tacit knowledge. 
Table 1. Ignorance and its relationships with knowledge. 
Aspects of Ignorance 
(Un)known 
(Un)knowns 
Other Terms Potential Transformation 
Things we know we do 
not know 
Known 
unknowns 
Conscious ignorance; 
specified ignorance; 
nonknowledge; negative 
knowledge 
Research to become 
known knowns, in turn 
revealing further 
unknowns 
Things we do not know 
we do not know 
Unknown 
unknowns 
Unrecognized ignorance; 
ignorance-squared; 
nescience 
Become aware of absence 
to convert to known 
unknowns 
Things we think we know 
but do not know 
Mistaken 
knowns 
Erroneous knowledge; 
uncertain knowledge; 
biased knowledge 
Correct or clarify 
knowledge to become 
known unknowns 
Things we do not know 
we know 
Unknown 
knowns 
Tacit knowledge; 
customary knowledge 
Need to be articulated to 
become known knowns 
How does the characterization of known unknowns, unknown unknowns, mistaken knowns, 
and unknown knowns, affect our approach to digital data and the creation of archaeological 
knowledge? Changing the emphasis away from knowledge switches the focus onto the implications 
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of the data we know are missing, data we do not know we are missing, data which might have existed 
but has not survived, data which might have existed but has not been collected, data which we do 
not know is selective or the reasons for its selection, and data we do not know is unreliable because 
of issues of measurement, uncertainty, ambiguity, and bias. It restores and reinforces an image of 
partial knowledge against what can seem an almost fetishistic perspective of data as a resource to be 
mined algorithmically with its volume overcoming any possible issues with reliability or quality [4]. 
While the digitalization of data is not the sole cause of the reduction of information through its 
archaeological capture, it is nevertheless a contributory factor and its own shortcomings are easily 
disguised in the presentation of the resulting digital data since many of these features are absent from 
current metadata or paradata. 
Consideration of (un)known (un)knowns can, therefore, highlight the challenges of data creation 
and subsequent use, but it also sheds light on our treatment and attitudes toward those data. For 
example, a study looking at the reuse of archaeological field data [14] suggested that although the 
lack of contextual information is frequently cited as a shortcoming of archaeological data, 
nevertheless data are reused as ways are found of circumventing the absences via workarounds. In 
this way, from a position of conscious ignorance, we proceed to combine things we think we know 
but do not know with unknown unknowns, which themselves are compounded by the unknown 
knowns of the original data creators. Thinking about the range of unknowns, therefore, leads to a 
series of questions about data. For example, what is omitted or missing? Are specific types of data 
not included? Why are they not included? What aspects do we habitually overlook or set aside in our 
practice? Where do the ambiguities, uncertainties, inaccuracies, and confusion lie? What are the 
consequences of these absences on our knowledge? In this light, Table 1 would suggest that there are 
two primary areas to be addressed: handling the known unknowns (and, by association, the mistaken 
unknowns), and dealing with the unknown knowns. 
5. On Known Unknowns 
Any archaeological study incorporating the reuse of data encounters a range of unknowns, 
especially when analyzing multiple datasets that have been captured by different people separated 
in time and space. Common problems that are typically encountered include variable recovery 
methodologies, multiple and/or idiosyncratic recording methods, and questions of trust in the 
identification and classification of cases, for example. These are not restricted to digital encounters 
but have been a feature of meta-analyses for many years and constitute a set of known unknowns 
and mistaken knowns when dealing with multiple datasets from different sources. For example, 
studies of burial data without direct access to the physical evidence typically need to resolve 
differential methods of aging and sexing individuals—whether through skeletal characteristics 
(assuming these can be taken at face value) or characteristic grave goods (assuming they are gender-
associated), or both, or neither (e.g., [48] (pp. 572–573); [49] (pp. 343–345); [50] (p. 2)). To resolve 
known unknowns such as these, data about age at death and sex are frequently fitted to general 
classes (such as neonate, infant, subadult, etc.) because of the variance in recording across different 
data sets (see also [51] (p. 540) for example), although such reclassification risks the creation of 
mistaken knowns. Similarly, identification of animal specimens may be recorded at different levels: 
from simple presence/absence to estimates of quantity recorded in different ways (e.g., [52] (pp. 4–5); 
[53] (p. 8); [54] (p. 5)), requiring the analyst to detect whether the absence of certain categories is 
genuine or simply that they were not considered (e.g., [54] (p. 5)). For a given analysis, datasets may 
need to exceed minimum estimates to be included (e.g., [53] (p. 8)), or quantities are omitted 
altogether (e.g., [54] (p. 6)), or the study restricted to the most abundant taxa (e.g., [55] (p. 2)). 
Elsewhere, differential recovery methodologies—whether screening is used, mesh size, collection, 
and retention procedures for artifacts and ecofacts, and so on—affect how that data can subsequently 
be used (e.g., [52] (p. 5); [53] (p. 8); [54] (p. 7)). Again, data may be set aside altogether, or certain 
fields dropped because they are missing from some datasets, or ultimately the problem ignored 
altogether because differential factors are seen to be outweighed by the quantity of data. The latter is 
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a common claim in “big data” analyses (e.g., [51] (p. 544); [53] (p. 1) although the statistical 
assumptions behind this kind of approach are open to challenge (e.g., [4] (p. S13)). 
These and similar kinds of known unknowns can be handled in various ways to address the 
problems and biases in the data but are most commonly addressed through data cleansing. These 
constitute a set of often undefined processes that seek to identify where the discrepancies lie, 
determine whether or not they can be resolved, and take the necessary action (correction, 
recategorization, or omission). Such issues may consist of syntactic anomalies (e.g., irregularities in 
the presentation of the data), semantic anomalies (e.g., handing duplicate or contradictory data), and 
coverage anomalies (e.g., missing or incomplete data) [56] (pp. 6–7). The experience of data cleansing 
is inevitably iterative, with multiple stages back and forth as problems with the data are often 
revealed only once an analysis has been attempted, as interesting insights are separated from data 
anomalies, as data are added or removed in an attempt to resolve problems (e.g., [57] (pp. 272–274)) 
and as mistaken knowledge comes to light. However, these iterations are often poorly documented, 
if at all, but this kind of documentation is an important component of ensuring the accountability of 
the researchers and the reusability of the data [27,58]. While there have been considerable efforts in 
recent years to make the collection of data documentation as easy as possible (e.g., [59] (p. 231)), this 
primarily relates to metadata for data discovery rather than paradata capturing the set of inferences, 
actions, and modifications that lie behind the data. In many respects, this is a far more complex 
problem. Capturing the provenance of data as a continuous chain of history back to its origins (e.g., 
[60] (p. 70)) in a manner which is automatically or at least easily captured and maintained remains 
an as-yet unsolved problem, and limited to specific instances: for example, EXIF tags embedded in 
images taken with digital cameras, or descriptive metadata summarizing geoprocessing variables 
and procedures embedded in GIS geodatabases (e.g., [61] (pp. 20–21)). The problem for a data reuser 
is that in their absence such details shift from known unknowns to unknown unknowns over time 
and between practitioners. 
6. On Unknown Knowns 
In many instances, unknown knowns consist of habitual practices that are not considered by the 
practitioner to be worthy of explanation or discussion. These only come to light when encountered 
by another who does not recognize them as standard practice (e.g., [62] (p. 67)). In this way, what is 
considered unnecessary or irrelevant and hence silent is potentially what another (usually later) 
researcher would consider to be meta/paradata or data. These silences consequently represent the 
unknown knowns of the original practitioner: tacit knowledge which operates through custom, 
experience, or instinct and which is rarely articulated or explained to others, ultimately becoming 
those others’ unknown unknowns. How do these unknown knowns arise in practice and become 
unknown unknowns? Here there are useful parallels with Hayes’ [63] discussion of forgetting, which 
she considers to be a powerful archaeological contribution to understanding the production of history 
[63] (p. 200). In part, this builds on the identification by Connerton [64] of seven kinds of forgetting, 
using a range of historical examples to show how forgetting leads to knowledge about the past being 
lost or ignored. Hayes sees forgetting as a critical component of memory [63] (p. 199), which parallels 
the way that ignorance is seen as part of acquiring knowledge. Indeed, ignorance is an outcome of 
successful forgetting, and, like ignorance, digital tools are frequently employed as a means of 
forestalling forgetting. The characterization of forgetting transposed into archaeological knowledge 
practice may, therefore, reveal something of the background to unknown knowns. 
6.1. Forgetting Disciplines 
Disciplinary divides may give rise to forgetting [63] (p. 204). For example, Khazraee [65] (p. 330) 
sees the integrity of an archaeological site as broken across different disciplinary specializations, with 
evidence viewed through different disciplinary lenses. In this sense forgetting may be envisaged as 
the absence of some specialists from the field, their restriction to the laboratory and post-excavation 
phase, or their omission from the investigatory and analytical process altogether, leading to certain 
categories of data not being recognized, collected, or analyzed. For instance, in their metastudy of 
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Neolithic farming using zooarchaeological data, Orton and colleagues [54] (p. 5) found that certain 
taxa of animals were only sporadically included in datasets, and argued that these absences were 
related to those categories being specialisms within zooarchaeology. Micromorphological studies 
may be similarly underrepresented, with geoarchaeologists frequently absent from field projects 
[66,67]. While archaeology has always been celebrated for its interdisciplinarity—it is “in our bones” 
[68] (p. 49)—this is not without its challenges. For example, the natural sciences may be perceived as 
threatening and provocative [68] (p. 50), and the incorporation of data from the natural and hard 
sciences into cultural narratives can be problematic at times (e.g., [69] (pp. 178–179)). A disciplinary 
approach is by definition limited and partial: “Disciplinary researchers inherit ways of interacting 
with the world that are specialized for producing certain kinds of knowledge, and this specialization 
brings certain kinds of ignorance with it” [70] (p. 645). Interdisciplinary research can, therefore, be 
seen as a means of redressing ignorance, but interdisciplinarity can itself be a source of ignorance: 
“ignorance can emerge as a function of how the group is collectively situated” [70] (p. 649). 
6.2. Forgetting through Effacement 
Effacement [63] (p. 210), where interactions are not written into the record, deliberately or 
otherwise, is related to Connerton’s repressive erasure [64] (pp. 60–61) which accentuates a specific 
perspective by covertly erasing or editing out parts and emphasizing others. In archaeological 
practice, this might be identified in three specific areas: the effacement of methodology, the 
effacement of technique, and effacement through translation. For example, methodological practice 
may be effaced through a black-boxing approach: for instance, Leighton [62] (p. 69) observes that 
archaeologists rarely describe in detail how an excavation was carried out or explain how specific 
practices support a particular claim. Similarly, Edgeworth warns that “Silent or tacit knowledge is 
one component in the mix, but at the same time processes of explicit thinking, reflection and 
discussion entailed in the practical labor of following cuts and other material patterns must not be 
written out of accounts of excavation.” [71] (p. 107). 
Effacement of technique is related to disciplinary forgetting (above). This may include the 
omission of geomorphological techniques [66], for example, but may simply be a consequence of 
different excavation strategies which affect the scale of examination of the deposits and their 
formation (e.g., [72] (p. 105); [67] (p. 238)). Effacement through translation most clearly arises through 
the digitization of analog records, an interpretative act involving decisions about what to include 
together with the categorization and standardization of information to suit the digital tools. 
Translation, therefore, always risks loss or change of meaning which may only partially be addressed 
through reflection and “data intimacy” [20] (p. 130).  
6.3. Forgetting over Time 
Certain actions or interactions may not be recognized as significant until well after the event, 
adding a temporal dimension to forgetting [63] (p. 205). In this context, decisions or activities may be 
considered insignificant or so customary that they are not recorded (and essentially effaced) but may 
come to be seen by others at a later time to crucially determine the functionality or usefulness of the 
data, by which time the opportunity to capture that information has been lost. Certain things are 
deemed worth recording while others are not, and these perspectives change over time under 
different paradigms and with different levels of resources. For instance, features from certain periods 
may be given precedence over those from others (e.g., [73] (p. 93)). As Edgeworth observes, “there is 
an aspect to the archaeologist’s perception and interpretation of the world that actively leaps out to 
regard some things as significant, so that these favored objects or features seem to stand out in the 
foreground of our attention, while thousands of other things (and aspects of things) not perceived to 
be significant remain in the background.” [71] (p. 110).  
The nature of archaeological remains as constructs rather than records, constituted and 
interpreted at the time of their recognition, means certain aspects may not be recognized in the initial 
encounter, may not be thought significant or relevant at the time, or may not be capable of being 
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captured, and are consequently laid aside, forgotten, becoming the unknown unknowns of 
subsequent encounters.  
6.4. Forgetting by Command 
Finally, there may be commanded forgetting [63] (p. 212), what Connerton calls “prescriptive 
forgetting” [64] (pp. 61–62). It is commonly characterized as institutionalized forgetting, perhaps 
most clearly represented in archaeology through top-down approaches to recording and increasingly 
mechanistic data capture, whether through paper proformas or digital equipment. Hence, for 
example, “The norms of our recording system enables forms, such as this trench plan, to be repeated, 
again and again, until they are ‘forgotten’ and simply become forms of life, and habitual practice” 
[73] (p. 87). Customary, if not mandated, recording systems are often seen as deskilling method and 
practice through providing predetermined descriptive fields and predefined categories (e.g., [74] (p. 
423)), and although not limited to digital systems they can be seen as supporting a digitally enhanced 
practice enabling fuller engagement with the physical data (e.g., [75] (p. 339)). In either case, an 
element of forgetting takes place within standardized practice, especially since “… when confronted 
by a feature or a site that is ‘out of place’ we immediately fall back upon our standardized and 
comfortable methods to create the trench and the feature—and thus render the past knowable.” [73] 
(p. 88). 
The range of forgetfulness surrounding practice usefully characterizes the range of unknown 
knowns which, unless they are captured in some way, risk becoming the unknown unknowns of 
subsequent practitioners separated by space and time. 
7. The Tacit Problem 
Taking these (un)known (un)knowns and transforming them into known knowns presents 
considerable challenges; however, as has been shown, these are not entirely unfamiliar within 
archaeological practice. For example, as discussed above there is a range of established methods for 
attempting to resolve the known unknowns inherent in analyses across multiple datasets, even if they 
are frequently not discussed or documented in detail. These approaches often bring their own 
limitations as they seek to address differential recording, sampling bias, or the range of anomalies 
within the data. Indeed, they may potentially introduce new problems—mistaken knowns—through 
incorrect recategorization, invalid treatment of “unknown” or “null” data, or mishandling of 
contradictory or duplicate data, for example. If such decisions and actions are themselves not 
adequately recorded subsequent studies using these newly formed datasets will be negatively 
impacted. Similarly, archaeological recognition of the importance of unknown knowns is seen in the 
use of unstructured recording methods during fieldwork using diaries or notebooks, often alongside 
standard proforma records, as a means of capturing elements of the tacit knowledge of the 
fieldworker through recording their thoughts, ideas, mistakes, decisions, and actions. In the process, 
a record of the changing understanding of the site is created, albeit one that mixes data, interpretation, 
and speculation, and which is often remote from the digital record and ultimately only deposited in 
the physical archive, if at all. Moreover, such unstructured methods may be largely restricted to 
research scenarios and absent from the commercial context because of time and resource constraints. 
In some instances, using less structured formats to represent more tacit elements of recording 
has been translated into a digital environment. For example, excavations at Çatalhöyük employed 
digital site diaries as a means of revealing the assumptions and preconceptions of the project team as 
part of the overall record [76] (pp. 436–437), while at Pompeii, digital diary-style entries were kept 
alongside the database forms [77] (p. 64). Elsewhere, the Federated Archaeological Information 
Management System (FAIMS) includes annotation fields on each data record, which is suggested to 
mimic handwritten annotations in the margins of proforma sheets [78] (p. 49). Such approaches are 
seen to contribute to a reflexive approach to fieldwork and are claimed to result in a richer body of 
data (e.g., [77] (p. 64)), although they may also result in a tension between standardized recording 
practices and the more fluid and flexible approaches which are seeking to expose the otherwise 
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largely tacit knowledge employed in the field (e.g., [79] (pp. S20–S21)). Again, commercial 
imperatives may restrict the application of such methods. 
However, these approaches to revealing unknown knowns are largely incomplete and based on 
a limited perspective of tacit knowledge. In particular, they assume that these unknown knowns can 
be externalized and are just waiting for the time and resource to be made available to simply retrieve 
them, whereas more widely tacit knowledge is understood to be difficult, if not impossible, to 
articulate and to codify (e.g., [80] (p. 129); [81]; [82] (p. 228); [83] (p. 472)). Indeed, like the paradox 
behind the study of ignorance—seeking to know what we do not know [32] (p. 18)—there are a series 
of paradoxes at the heart of the investigation of tacit knowledge. If tacit knowledge can be articulated, 
is it still tacit [84] (p. 364)? Or if tacit knowledge cannot be articulated then can it even be discussed? 
If it can, then presumably it can be recorded [81]. This tension is exacerbated by the introduction of 
digital technology which tends to focus on what can be codified, emphasizing explicit knowledge 
over tacit and attempting to convert tacit into explicit. In turn, this might suggest that there are some 
aspects of tacit knowledge that are easier to articulate than others and it may be useful to distinguish 
between these, in the process highlighting key aspects of these unknown knowns along with potential 
methods for their representation.  
Over time, tacit knowledge has become characterized as a rich and complex tapestry of 
competencies, skills, know-how, physical abilities, practices, personal insight, expertise, gut-feeling, 
and so on (e.g., [85] (p. 84)), which may be capable of externalization to differing degrees. For 
example, Kingston [81] defines three categories of tacit knowledge (summarized in Table 2):  
1. Symbolic Experiential Knowledge is “gained from experience that the knowledge owner knows 
they possess. It is in the form of words or concepts; it can, therefore, be verbalized or recorded, 
but never has been” [81]. It primarily consists of heuristics, categorizations, and patterns which 
can be made explicit through words, diagrams, and models, for example.  
2. Non-symbolic Experiential Knowledge is “gained from experience that is not in the form of symbols 
but in some other form: numeric; geometric; perceptual; or physiological. The owner of this 
knowledge knows that they have it, but may find it very difficult to verbalise” [81]. If capable of 
being captured, such knowledge may be represented through the use of photographs, diagrams, 
videos, and so on.  
3. True Tacit Knowledge is knowledge that a person has but does not know it, which may make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to capture.  
Kingston’s three-way characterization is broadly similar to Collins’ [86] characterization of tacit 
knowledge, for example (Table 2). Symbolic experiential knowledge is comparable to Relational Tacit 
Knowledge (or weak tacit knowledge): knowledge that can be made explicit [86] (pp. 85-98). 
Nonsymbolic experiential knowledge is equivalent to Somatic Tacit Knowledge (or medium tacit 
knowledge) and is associated with the properties of human bodies and brains, and physical things 
[86] (pp. 99-117). True tacit knowledge largely corresponds to Collective Tacit Knowledge (or strong 
tacit knowledge) which we do not know how to make explicit and cannot see how it might be 
explicated [86] (pp. 119-138). Similarly, Virtanen [87] identifies what he defines as three different 
levels of content of mind from the perspective of its accessibility which again broadly map onto the 
characterizations of Kingston and Collins (Table 2). He sees conscious linguistic representations, or 
representations that are capable of being made linguistic, in terms of declarative knowledge or 
propositional thoughts [87] which are like the categorical or pattern-based knowledge forms 
identified by Kingston [81]. Then there are conscious representations that are difficult to articulate, 
which Virtanen [87] sees as more phenomenological in nature, where there may be a lack of suitable 
words, an inability to describe the phenomenon or experience, or an incompletely formulated 
concept. There is a clear equivalence here with Kingston’s nonsymbolic experiential knowledge and 
Collins’ somatic tacit knowledge. What remains is incapable of being represented: the unreachable 
content of the mind [87], which maps onto Kingston’s true tacit knowledge and Collins’ collective or 
strong tacit knowledge. 
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Table 2. Mappings of tacit knowledge. 
Opacity Kingston [81] Collins [86] Virtanen [87] 
 
Symbolic Experiential 
Knowledge 
Relational Tacit 
Knowledge (weak tacit 
knowledge) 
Conscious linguistic 
representations 
 
Nonsymbolic 
Experiential Knowledge 
Somatic Tacit Knowledge 
(medium tacit 
knowledge) 
Conscious 
representations that are 
difficult to articulate 
 True Tacit Knowledge 
Collective Tacit 
Knowledge (strong tacit 
knowledge) 
Unreachable content 
incapable of being 
consciously represented 
Breaking down and characterizing tacit knowledge in these ways underlines the limitations of 
prior attempts to record archaeological tacit knowledge during data capture, which inevitably focus 
on aspects that can be (relatively) easily captured and codified, and which can be incorporated within 
a digital structure. In the process, significant aspects of the unknown knowns are left unaddressed. 
For example, in a reversal of Pozzali’s criticism of the wider body of literature on tacit knowledge 
[82] (p. 229), archaeology rarely captures aspects of the implicit skills and kinesthetic abilities 
associated with bodily engagement with the material evidence in the field or laboratory, because 
these are difficult to articulate and no simple way of communicating them has been identified. 
8. Tacit Articulation 
The most common approaches to externalizing tacit knowledge are through dialogue, narration, 
or discourse (e.g., [88] (p. 1133); [80] (p. 130); [84] (p. 360)), although of course, this depends on its 
capability to be articulated in the first place. Tacit knowledge mediates practice and may be 
foregrounded when actions surrounding a particular task do not meet the practitioner’s tacit 
expectations. Such breakdowns help practitioners exteriorize tacit practice in response to anomalous 
situations through employing coping strategies which reveal formerly hidden aspects and 
connections within practice. These may then be externalized through what Tsoukas calls attention-
drawing forms of talk: “‘look at this,’ ‘have you thought about this in that way?’, ‘try this,’ ‘imagine 
this,’ ‘compare this to that’” [83] (p. 471). In this way, he argues, tacit knowledge is manifested—
rather than captured, converted or translated—in what we do: “New knowledge comes about not 
when the tacit is converted to explicit, but when tacit knowledge is re-punctuated (articulated) 
through dialogical interaction” [83] (p. 473). Analysis of discourse can reveal the tacit knowledge 
used by the practitioner to resolve their encounter, so that “… an understanding of speakers’ lived in 
experience and interpretation of their world—their orientation to context—can be unlocked” [88] (p. 
1136).  
Although strongly reminiscent of trench-side or laboratory conversations, such discourses or 
dialogues are rarely captured in archaeological contexts. What is otherwise largely silent may be 
represented within field diaries and notebooks, for example, but otherwise the opportunities for a 
narrative explanation within standardized data recording are typically limited. However, one area 
which has been investigated, if not widely implemented, is video recording. Video has been 
employed on a number of sites (e.g., [89–91]), notably at Çatalhöyük where it was introduced in as a 
means of providing reflexivity—“the camera at the trowel’s edge” [91]—through recording group 
discussions in the excavation trenches along with individual accounts and laboratory work [92] (p. 
696). This practice was limited since the cameras were not operated by the excavators themselves and 
filming was dependent on the archaeologists summoning a camera when something was considered 
worth recording [93] (p. 39). Elsewhere at Çatalhöyük, the BACH (Berkeley Archaeologists at 
Çatalhöyük) project created a detailed video archive recorded as part of the excavation 
documentation, including short digital diaries and discussions among excavators and lab specialists, 
for example [94]; [93] (p. 41). Advantages of video recording may include the level of spontaneity and 
individual expression in spoken, rather written, language, and the way that spoken language seems 
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less dominated by formalized, standardized codes (e.g., [95] (p. 230)), both of which may facilitate 
the externalization of tacit knowledge. More recently, Chrysanthi and colleagues [91] described 
experiments with personal video recorders worn during fieldwork at Portus and Çatalhöyük. Using 
head-mounted cameras enabled hands-free capture of excavation and recording [91] (p. 250), 
recording conversations about the work, key points of debate and discussion, and in some cases 
showing the act of excavation itself without commentary. These are described as narratives of the 
lived experience and as arguments surrounding the archaeological process [91] (pp. 254–255). For 
example, they note the way in which uncertainty surrounding interpretation is captured on video, 
highlighting the development of understanding in contrast to the way in which it is more commonly 
subsumed within standard recording practices [91] (pp. 262–264). Their approach is akin to what 
Morgan [96] (p. 334) characterizes as the phenomenological genre of video recording, providing the 
viewer with the gaze of the archaeologist and conveying their personal experience of the excavation 
process, unlike the direct testimonial approach [96] (p. 331) which creates authoritative summaries 
presenting the conclusions rather than the processes. 
One of the strengths of video capture is, therefore, the prospect of recording the lost aspects of 
process—capturing aspects of both the symbolic experiential and nonsymbolic experiential forms of 
tacit knowledge, whether through verbalizing heuristic decisions, representing patterns, 
demonstrating physical actions in the moving images, or visualizing the shape, texture, and color of 
layers and the relationships between them by moving the viewpoint around, for instance. For 
example, video provides a means of capturing the materialization of observations through drawing 
and the conversations that occur around them [97] (p. 146). A final archived field drawing represents 
the end of a process that is normally not captured: from the initial marking of the actual 
archaeological surfaces to differentiate the interfaces, through intermediate sketches and diagrams 
(e.g., [21] (p. 104)) and associated annotations, these intervening procedures shed light on the 
developing understanding of the features concerned.  
On the other hand, video is limited in certain key respects. For example, poor color reproduction 
of sections and layers [91] (p. 253) may be compounded by insufficient resolution, and variable levels 
of exposure and focus, especially in poor lighting conditions, which may restrict the utility of the 
resulting video (all problems shared by photography in general). More significant is the absence of 
sensory information beyond the visual and aural. While the sound of tools on surfaces may provide 
some insight into the physical encounter alongside its visualization, it provides little information 
about the levels of resistance, texture, and “feel” that expert excavators rely on. This is what Gant and 
Reilly [21] (p. 108) call the “voice of the deposits” and the multithreaded narrative created by the 
different aspects of interaction with them. The affective nature of archaeology modifies thought and 
action through encounters with its materiality and physicality (e.g., [98] (p. 4); [99] (pp. 360-361)) at 
the same time as the archaeologist materializes the archaeological feature [100] (p. 78). Such aspects 
are perhaps best suited to the impressionistic genre of video [96] (p. 332) or else move beyond video 
to incorporate other digital techniques. For example, the use of 3D imaging from photography can 
show textural as well as color variations in stratigraphy (e.g., [101] (p. 188)) and is increasingly widely 
used in archaeological practice. The representation of the sensual has been attempted through 3D 
models of troweling gestures [21] (pp. 110-112) and “sonic stratigraphy” [21] (pp. 113-115), through 
auralization of spaces (e.g., [102,103]), and through the creation of multi-sensory augmented reality 
incorporating real-world imagery with 3D models which respond to actions and use haptics to 
capture feel and smell (e.g., [104,105]).  
Other means of externalizing the unknown knowns may also be sought. For example, analyzing 
the ways in which a project archive changes through time may reveal the shifts in methodology and 
interpretative values by detecting and mapping the alterations to the underlying data structures [79] 
(pp. S26-S28). The scope for such an approach relies on a long-standing project such as at Çatalhöyük, 
but it does point to the potential for revealing aspects of the inferences and tacit knowledge 
embedded within the data collected through analyzing their structure. This is akin to Gardin’s work 
on codifying archaeological representation, discourse and meaning (e.g., [106]; see summary in [107] 
(pp. 311–316)) in which he sought to analyze “the mental operations carried out in archaeological 
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constructions of all sorts, from the collecting of data to the writing of an article or book” [106] (p. xi). 
For example, applying a model of argumentation such as defined by CRMinf [108,109], while not 
designed to externalize tacit knowledge since it specifically reasons about explicit facts, may reveal 
tacit elements in terms of what is “left over” from or does not fit within the formal model. This kind 
of inverse modeling, where tacit knowledge is revealed by what is being modeled without being 
modeled itself, may also be applied in other areas. For instance, the kinds of knowledge elicitation 
techniques applied to the development of expert systems in the 1980s may in certain respects reveal 
weak tacit knowledge [86] (p. 160) through the attempt to model the reasoning of human experts 
using methods ranging from discourse analysis, interviews, think-aloud methods, and critical 
decision analysis. While only partly successful at the time due to the degree of formalization required 
and the difficulty of articulating tacit knowledge (e.g., [110]), expert systems were capable of 
emulating the outcomes of human reasoning in certain well-defined areas, and analysis of the gaps 
in those emulations may reveal aspects corresponding to tacit elements within those fields. While 
expert systems sought to manually create a set of formal rules to adequately describe real-world 
reasoning, the more recent development of deep learning tools seek to reduce a complex problem 
into a series of simple nested mappings, each described by a different layer of the model and 
generated automatically from data (e.g., [111] (pp. 5–7)). Deep learning tools and neural networks 
may be capable of surfacing medium tacit knowledge [86] (pp. 160–161) through the way in which 
they operate through training programs that use positive and negative feedback to fine-tune the 
system. For example, a neural network may draw inferences using features in images other than those 
expected, and rather than being treated necessarily as errors to be refined out, they may shed light 
on potential tacit inferences and biases instead. Externalizing true, or strong, tacit knowledge is more 
problematic still, as noted above. However, Kingston [81] suggests that it may be possible to use 
statistical associations between evidence used to make decisions and the decisions reached in order 
to gain some insight into the knowledge involved, in much the same way as knowledge is represented 
in neural networks. 
9. From Ignorance into Knowledge 
This paper has sought to demonstrate the value of approaching the gaps in archaeological digital 
knowledge by turning from the traditional evaluation of what we know to consider what we do not 
know, and characterizing the different forms of ignorance and their implications for archaeological 
practice. It has shown how current archaeological approaches to resolving the (un)known 
(un)knowns are limited in scope, whether through the poorly documented methods of handling 
known unknowns or the restricted perspective on articulating unknown knowns. Shining a light on 
these limitations offers the prospect of addressing them, and several means of doing so have been 
outlined. However, the approach is not without its challenges, some of which remain to be addressed.  
For example, there is the question as to whether the process adds much to archaeological 
knowledge in the first place. For instance, Chadwick [72] (p. 103) questioned whether the hours of 
video recording at Çatalhöyük added much to site interpretation, or whether it simply reflected a 
desire to capture or record everything. However, the proposition here is that, far from attempting to 
record “everything” (were that even possible), this approach emphasizes the importance of capturing 
what is already undertaken as a matter of standard practice so as to better represent existing practice 
rather than creating a new practice or capturing new data for its own sake. In the process, our 
knowledge claims will be strengthened and enhanced. Elsewhere, Leighton [62] (p. 67) argues that 
the small differences in basic archaeological practices between projects and between countries are not 
sufficient to affect our evaluation of the knowledge claims of other archaeologists. While this may be 
true, here it is argued that our knowledge of those practices is insufficient without proper 
consideration of their (un)known (un)knowns as a means of surfacing the process by which 
interpretations arise, which otherwise remains primarily implicit. In this way, archaeology can 
indeed challenge existing Science and Technology Studies models of scientific knowledge production 
as Leighton [62] (p. 68) suggests, but from a position of greater strength than is currently the case. 
Information 2020, 11, 278 14 of 20 
 
Of more practical concern are the implications of adopting this kind of approach in the real 
world. Do the practical realities outweigh any supposed theoretical purity? It is certainly true that 
many of these techniques take additional time. For instance, the time taken to process video footage 
is not insignificant, which is one reason why it has seen relatively little use. The need to create 
descriptive metadata, link clips to site records, generate textual descriptions of content, extract aural 
narrative components as text, and so on, represent a considerable investment of time. Where such 
processing is undertaken, it tends to be in the evenings during fieldwork and during the post-
excavation phase (e.g., [91] (p. 251)) which clearly raises issues of sustainability. Aspects of processing 
may be automated to some degree: for instance, keyframes for summary storyboarding may be 
identified and extracted (e.g., [112]) and transcripts automatically created with semantic concepts and 
keywords extracted (e.g., [113]), but these techniques are in their relative infancy and not yet widely 
available. Consequently, to be feasible the approach must be capable of being embedded within 
existing practice. For example, increasingly commonplace in the field is 3D imaging (3Di) using 
structure from motion analysis of multiple overlapping photographs as a means of capturing an 
excavation’s plans and sections or a local landscape. This is much faster than traditional drawing and 
survey techniques and can incorporate color and texture which can be enhanced through virtual 
lighting. The benefits are not unequivocal (e.g., [97] (pp. 143–145)), but, rightly or wrongly, there is 
evidence that the technique is being increasingly used to replace rather than enhance traditional field 
drawings (e.g., [114] (p. 254)). Whether such imagery is used as a replacement for, or enhancement 
to, traditional field drawing, there are time savings to be had. While in a commercial environment 
these might be used to reduce costs and time on site, they may also be used to enhance the 
archaeological encounter itself (e.g., [101] (p. 188)). Indeed, Powlesland [115] (p. 23) argues that “… 
dropping the traditional approach to recording and replacing the record with an ongoing and 
repeated process of 3Di … would be a tragic misuse of a very powerful technology”, emphasizing 
instead the value of spending the time released to gain a better interpretative understanding of the 
archaeology. This would also provide the opportunity to implement methods that seek to capture the 
silences within that interpretative process.  
Finally, it has to be asked whether a focus on ignorance risks being detrimental to the credibility 
of archaeological knowledge. Can it lead to the accusation of providing comfort for “alternative facts” 
through its highlighting of uncertainties in the archaeological process and emphasizing the 
shortcomings in the knowledge used in arriving at archaeological interpretations? Will it increase 
skepticism in the outcomes of archaeological inquiry and foster the further growth of 
pseudoarchaeology? Here, the argument is that a failure to recognize and address ignorance would 
adopt a position of essentially unarguable knowledge claims that is unhelpfully associated with 
authority and power. Fundamentally, a focus on ignorance encourages a greater degree of honesty 
in knowledge creation. Indeed, the mistaken illusion of knowledge—the things we think we know 
but do not—is arguably a greater threat than the unknown knowns, known unknowns, and unknown 
unknowns. In this light, ignorance is a virtuous condition for inquiry and a foundational aspect of 
knowledge (e.g., [116] (p. 386); [30] (p. 57)). Identifying areas of ignorance provides for new 
investigations creating new knowledge that will, in turn, reveal more ignorance. Consequently, 
addressing ignorance simply makes our archaeological knowledge more robust through inverting 
the lens through which we view it and shedding light on our “data shadows” [11]. 
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